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Abstract: Israel is perceived in the international environment as a one of the top leaders in 
innovation. This is proven by the progressively high position of this country in international 
rankings and the participation of Israeli scientists and technologists in prestigious inter-
national programs. In this article we claim that the aims of Israeli innovation policy, which 
has the biggest impact on the shape and content of the innovation ecosystem, are highly 
politicized. The status quo driven by the key assumption of the state strategy, according to 
which obtaining a competitive predominance in the political international environment will 
be achieved through economic instruments, primarily technological innovation. Therefore 
the aim of this article is to critically analyze Israeli innovation policy and the innovation 
ecosystem, paying special attention to the state interest and the government activities in this 
realm. For the purpose of this analysis some basic assumptions of the neoliberal economy 
redefined by Arie Krampf will be utilized. Furthermore to better describe and explain the 
link between politics and economy in the Israeli innovation ecosystem we will refer to the 
K.N. Waltz considerations on mechanisms of the political and economic system in a global-
izing world.
Keywords: Israel; Israeli innovation policy; innovation ecosystem; technology and science; 
hi-tech; research and development (R&D); international-political competitiveness
Introduction
There is no doubt that the history of Israeli innovativeness is a success story. Just to men-
tion the Global Competitiveness Report 2017 – 2018, where Israel has reached 3rd place in 
terms of innovation and 16th position in a general assessment of competitiveness (out of 
137 economies covered) (World Economic Forum, 2018). The country also has obtained 17th 
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position (out of 127 economies) in the Global Innovation Ranking 2017 (Cornell University, 
INSEAD, and WIPO 2017,p. 238). This same report classifies Israel as in 1st place in research-
ers, venture capital deals and global expenditures on R&D (GERD) performed by business, 
and research talent in business enterprise. It also gains 3rd position on expenditure in R&D 
and 1st place in industry research collaboration and ICT services export (Ibid., p. 40).
Obviously, the source of such a situation is to be found in the construction of the national 
innovation system, where effectively organized relations between scientific and research 
institutions, the industrial sector and business and public institutions play a key role. Here, 
State institutions play an extremely important, one could say pivotal, role being constantly 
interested and active in supporting and moderating the Israeli innovations ecosystem. For 
the current government (as well as the previous ones) Israeli innovativeness is a powerful 
diplomatic tool. As B. Netanyahu putted it “economic dynamism can help make friends as 
well as fortunes” (2018). In other words, innovative, economic competitiveness has brought 
Israel many new partners and allies and became a crucial element of Israeli diplomacy. 
Therefore, this paper seeks to contribute to the ongoing debate on innovative economies in 
the era of national states revival (e.g.: Hall & Rosenberg, 2010; Casadella et al., 2015, Edler 
& Fagerberg, 2017), which will, most probably, be developing rapidly. It aims also to bridge 
the highly politicized aspects of the Israeli innovation policy development with its market 
and industry oriented elements. 
Surprisingly, so far there is not much literature on the given topic, either from the more 
economic point of view or the political science and/or international relations perspective. 
However, Israel tends to serve more and more often as an interesting example and case study 
(Paredes-Frigolett & Pyka, 2017; Edler & Fagerberg 2017) of how the contemporary innova-
tion ecosystems work also in comparative studies (Frenkel, et al., 2003; Breznitz, Ornston 
2012; Rubin, et al., 2015). So, there is also an extending discussion on the mechanism of the 
Israeli economic system innovativeness, where authors are trying to follow and explain the 
evolutionary development of the innovation ecosystem in Israel (Spiegel, 2013; Rubin et al., 
2015). A comprehensive, and relatively new, study on Israeli innovations presents a report 
titled Mapping Research and Innovation in the State of Israel (UNESCO, 2016). Previously, 
an analytical work on this topic had also been done by the Israeli Samuel Neaman from the 
Institute for National Policy Research (Frenkel, et. al 2011). In academic debate, some atten-
tion is being given to the financial mechanism of the Israeli innovative ecosystem, especially 
to the importance of the availability of venture capital (Wonglimpiyarat, 2015, 2016).
As mentioned above the main goal of this article is to critically analyze Israeli innova-
tion policy and to describe and explain mechanisms and processes typical for the Israeli 
innovation ecosystem. We will try to find out what are the expected, and the side effects of 
the Israeli strategy of becoming a global innovative player. We will look at the importance 
of international economic and political cooperation for innovativity, bearing in mind the 
nature and substance of the Israeli economic system characterized by A. Krampf as an 
‘nationalist’ or ‘hawkish’ neoliberalism (Krampf 2018). In his newly published book titled 
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Israeli Path to Neoliberalism. The State, Continuity and Change, Krampf refers to the category 
of ‘geopolitics’ by mentioning the importance of the linkages between the Israeli foreign and 
economic policy and the “geopolitical conditions in the Middle East” or the “geopolitical 
vision” of Israeli politicians and economists. In short, domestic economic policy is strictly 
linked with Israeli foreign policy and one serves the other, being interconnected elements 
of a systemically ordered and organised environment. 
Moving on, it can be said that the world economy is a constitutive element of the inter-
national environment, by many scholars perceived through the lens of systemic analysis. 
So, Israeli economy is and wants to be part of the international economic system. As PM, B. 
Netanyahu has argued “technology without free market does not get you very far” but even 
assuming that the Israeli government policy is fully coherent with the values of a free market 
economy (which is, to an extent true), economy remains under the influence of politics and 
still the governments not markets are driving and shaping the dynamic of international 
relations. In this light, K. Waltz correctly noted “the growth of a country’s economic capability 
to the great power level places it at the center of regional and global affairs. It widens the 
range of a state’s interests and increases their importance” (Waltz, 2000, p. 33). The above 
noted assumptions introduce us to the analysis which aims to explain the linkages between 
the economically granted innovation policy and Israeli political strategy. 
Some theoretical and conceptual remarks
To better explain the interconnections between the international and national economic 
systems and political cooperation for innovativeness, as mentioned above the model of 
‘nationalist’ or ‘hawkish’ neoliberalism described by A. Krampf will be employed. As Krampf 
claims “‘hawkish neoliberalism’ can be understood as a new form of neo-mercantilism”, an 
Israeli – specific response to new domestic, international and geopolitical conditions. The 
‘nationalist neoliberal’ vision, has been developing contrary to the ‘internationalist neoliberal 
dovish’ assumption that “the economic transition of Israel not only would make the economy 
more efficient, but would also pave the way to a more peaceful Middle East, based on inter-
national and regional economic cooperation and interdependence” (Krampf 2018). The core 
element of the ‘nationalist neoliberalism’ was the concept of national security. What is more, 
interdependence, as an international relations mechanism, wasn’t seen as a source of peace 
and stability; it has been often identified as a threat to state security, being associated with 
‘political economic terror’, in which Israel has been threatened with boycott and isolation. 
To sum up, a ‘neoliberal nationalist’ would believe that “national security policy strategy 
is accompanied by external political and economic pressure” (Krampf 2018) and therefore 
to confront this external pressure, Israel must have a sturdy industry and the government 
must support it. In other words, international economic cooperation would be a tool to 
pursue national interest and not at all to increase the interdependence or introduce more 
international rules and institutions. In this respect Israeli decision makers had to find a way 
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to take the respective (strong enough) position in the world economic system to strengthen 
its political influence and effectiveness. A highly stable economy has been perceived by the 
Israeli ruling elites as a pre-condition for pursuing foreign and security policies. One can 
say that by increasing the competiveness and effectiveness of the Israeli economy, it was 
possible to decrease international political dependence, while at the same time maximize 
the economic benefit it can extract from international cooperation. Considering the above, 
we will focus on the impact of Israel innovation policy on the increasing the competitiveness 
and effectiveness of its economy.
The decision to promote and invest in innovative sectors of Israeli economy, based on 
high technologies, was taken in the mid-80’s of the XXth century. Israel was one of the first 
countries to introduce special innovation legislation in 1984 (the Law for the Encouragement 
of Industrial Research and Development (“the R&D Law” later known as the “Innovation 
Law”). It has defined the parameters of government policy towards industrial R&D ever 
since. From then, the Israeli economic system has gone through serious structural changes. 
As a result, the Israeli economy (at least in its important piece) was transformed to become 
a market-knowledge based economy, driven by the private sector and characterized by 
a strong orientation towards international markets (UNESCO 2016, p. 12). It can be argued 
that reforms undertaken in Israel in the 80’s and continued in the 90’s of XXth century were 
to catch up the main stream of globalization processes, since “much of the world has been left 
aside”. This was right in the cases of most of Africa and Latin America, Russia, a large part of 
Asia and all of the Middle East except Israel (…) as K. Waltz  points out (1999, p. 695). 
In general, the Israeli economic transformation and growth came from the strategy of 
becoming one of the world’s leading innovators, rather than one of many imitators. It seem 
that at least some Israeli politicians but also other important market and academia payers 
understood correctly the competitive nature of international system where “in political as 
in economic development, late comers imitate the practices and adopt the institutions of 
the countries who have shown the way” (Ibid.). Israelis were fully conscious that “the future 
belongs to those who innovate” (Netanyahu, 2018). Moreover being competitive and effective 
international players is not only a matter of understanding and being conscious but also most 
of all it is a matter of the capacity to act on this conviction. Technological innovativeness 
has become the core element of the strategy of capacity building. 
Since this paper focuses so deeply on innovations, it is worthwhile to agree upon a certain 
and clear definition of the given term, which has recently become highly popular and 
therefore very often used in the public discourse by politicians, journalists and commenta-
tors in different contexts, carrying sometimes various meanings. In this paper the term will 
be strictly related to the technological innovations1, which, in the case of Israel, plays the 
1 The term ‘technological innovations’ comprises new products and processes and significant techno-
logical changes of products and processes. An innovation has been implemented if it has been introduced 
on the market (product innovation) (Frascati, 2015). 
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most prominent role in the Israeli innovation ecosystem and furthermore in the country’s 
economic system. As described in the next section, the Israeli economic system consists of 
a relatively small, but excellent, high-tech sector, which serves as an engine of the Israeli 
economy; but it also contains a much less effective, and much larger traditional industry 
and service sector (UNESCO 2016). 
In this respect innovation policy can be defined as a set of policy instruments and 
appropriate institutions that assist in the adoption of technologies and the introduction 
of new goods and services to the market (UNESCO 2016, p.24). Following that, while 
analyzing the dynamics of the national innovation ecosystem, it is important to stress the 
relationships among the actors and institutions which facilitates the economic development 
and growth. The system itself is composed of state institutions, scientific and research units 
(academia) and private and public firms representing the business and industry sector, 
aimed at “production, diffusion and exploitation of knowledge” for economic, social and also 
political purposes (Wonglimpiyarat,2016, p. 20). Considering such a systemic approach is 
necessary to better understand the factors and conditions of state authorities activity aiming 
to achieve national policy goals in accordance with the national interest, both in internal 
(national) and external (international) dimensions through technological innovation. 
Israeli innovation policy – an effective model in transition 
The following section aims to define and characterise the Israeli innovation ecosystem. At 
first, we will try to conceptualise the primary goal of Israeli innovation, by analyzing declara-
tions and statements (legal and political). Secondly, we aim to answer the question: where 
are the Israeli innovations? In other words we will consider both the territorial and sectoral 
location of it, which should eventually lead us to better understanding of the structural and 
functional outlook of the Israeli innovation ecosystem, being a part of the state economic 
ecosystem. Consequently, we will critically analyse the declarative goals of the Israeli in-
novation policy in the light of its shape and content and try to assess its effectiveness by 
looking at its results. 
What are the goals and objectives of the Israeli innovation policy?
Israel, by making strategic choices, aims at optimizing the country’s position in the inter-
national environment (including in the global economy), from its own geopolitical and 
geo-economic constraints, has made a flywheel of its political and international economic 
development. Though it is a relatively small country (both in terms of territory and popula-
tion), being under constant political and economic pressure from outside, it has produced 
more start-up companies than larger, more peaceful and stable nations (Senor & Singer, 
2009). This should not be surprising once we acknowledge that the national innovation 
policy is considered especially relevant for small states, as a part of their adjustment to the 
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changing international, economic and technological order, and for improvement to their 
own economic and technological situation (Pustovrh & Jaklič 2014). However, in the case of 
Israel, which has already had a very advanced innovation policy and developed economy – 
innovativeness is perceived not as way to adjust to international order, rather to participate 
in the creation and shaping of it. 
As Eli Cohen, the Israeli Minister of Economy and Industry, put it “in a global economy 
characterized by technological innovation, Israel is a key player” and one of the primary 
governmental policy goals is “the preservation of Israel’s leadership position in R&D, and 
its unique entrepreneurial culture, especially in fields at the forefront of technology  (IIA, 
2017b). In other words the declared objective of the Israeli innovation policy is “maintain-
ing Israel’s position at the forefront of global innovation and elevating the entire economy 
through technological innovation” (IIA, 2017a;). In strategic planning of future trends and 
directions of social and economic development, Israel wants to focus on upgrading the 
economy so “the State of Israel will be among the world’s ten to fifteen leading countries in 
terms of income per capita. It will strive for the good of all its citizens, their quality of life, 
and that of its future generations. Israeli society (…) will rely on the cultural and scientific/
technological capabilities of its people, on its wealth of human capital, and on innovation 
and initiative” (USISTC, 2008, p. 15). To achieve these objectives, authors of the strategic 
plan “Israel 2028” claim that one has to acknowledge that “the chances for Israel’s social 
and economic prosperity also depend to a large extent on strengthening regional trends 
of peace and calm, both in the immediate (Palestinian, Syrian and Lebanese) circle and in 
the further circle of threats from Iran and other focal points of radical, hostile Islam. The 
circles of economy, technology, policy and security interface with and feed each other” (Ibid). 
Therefore Israel should focus on optimal and successful “integration into globalization”, most 
of all by be being a competitive player on international markets.
Summing up, the main aim of Israel’s state innovation policy, as manifested by the dec-
larations of key policy makers, is to strengthen Israeli international political and economic 
influence, in combination with positive international visibility. This external policy goal has 
been seen as a pre-condition for internal development. In other words, the existence and 
survival of Israel has been, to very big extent, dependent on the external – international 
circumstances. Among them, two can be considered as most important: the elimination 
of the existential threats which were addressed from the neighbourhood and improving 
international recognition and legitimacy. In both cases successes in the realm of Israeli 
technological innovations are not only a helpful but even a necessary component of state 
strategy operationalization. 
Where are the innovations? 
The fallowing section defines both the territorial and sectoral location of Israeli innova-
tiveness. Moreover it aims to present the structure of Israel’s innovative sector and the 
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interconnectedness between civil and military industries. As for the territorial location 
of innovative industry, the greatest concentration of hi-tech firms can be observed in the 
so called ‘Israeli Silicon Vadi’ (usually compared to Silicon Valley in California, US). The 
creation of innovative clusters concentrated in the Israeli Silicon Vadi is definitely a result 
of politically driven decisions, rather than free market rooted dynamics (Wonglimpiyarat 
2016). High concentrations of technologically innovative industry can be found in the area 
around Tel Aviv, including small clusters around the cities of Ra’anana, Petah Tikva, Herzliya, 
Netanya, the academic city of Rehovot and its neighbour Rishon Le Zion. Hi-tech clusters 
can be found also in northern part of Israel in Haifa and Caesarea, and in the south in Beer 
Sheva. Recently there were also some innovative developments in Jerusalem. Geographical 
proximity between the R&D centers, industrial sites and developed urban areas combined 
with very good home and international transport connections and facilities and with a con-
centration of human capital should be seen positive characteristic and an advantage of the 
national innovation ecosystem. On the other hand it does not help in the sustainable and 
inclusive development of the economic system as a whole.
As for the industry’s areas and sectors where the greatest concentration of innovative 
solutions, start ups and VC investments can observed, one can point to:
• information and communication technology sector;
• medical and pharmaceutical sector (including: medical devices);
• agriculture and biotechnology sector;
• natural resources and energy sector (with a rapidly growing renewable energy sector, 
and groundbreaking water technologies);
A very important component of the Israeli economic system is defense and aerospace 
industries, from which transfer of knowledge and advanced technologies to civilian in-
dustries takes place, permanently accelerating and enriching technological and economic 
development (Broude et al., 2013). This specific sector enjoys a privileged position both in 
terms of access to long term financing facilities and a very high level of public legitimization 
for the state militarization. Israel, for the past decades, has had one of the highest military 
burdens (military expenditure as share of GDP) in the world (Broude et al., 2013; World Bank 
2018). The military industry sector is a space for the operation of around 150 firms, among 
which are large state owned and government controlled companies like the Israeli Aerospace 
Industry, Israel Military Industries, Rafael and smaller but prominent and influential private 
players of Israeli but also international markets e.g. Elbit System. 
The phenomenon of interconnection between the level of militarization of different 
realms of the Israeli public sphere and technological innovativeness should be viewed 
through the lens of the basic needs of every state, namely the need to ensure its security. It 
seems that the sectoral location of Israeli innovations is a function of a specific perception 
of the basic goals of state policy which is ensuring existential survival and security. This is 
true not only when one refers to the military sector, but also other innovation sectors such 
as Israel nanotechnology or advanced food production or innovation in the energy sector. 
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Achievements in each, are important to the efforts to upgrade the level of security: social, 
economic, political but above all existential security. 
Foundations, shape and content of the Israeli innovation policy 
The legal framework of the Israeli innovation policy is created by special legislation and stra-
tegic planning. It is true that the legal infrastructure plays a key role in enabling the ongoing 
hi-tech revolution in Israel. However, the legislation framing and regulating the innovation 
ecosystem in Israel remains under the process of permanent changes. These changes are 
not revolutionary, rather they are evolutionary. The most relevant here is already mentioned 
Law for Encouragement of Research, Development and Technological Innovation in the 
Industry (known as an “Innovation Law”) adopted in 1984 and since then amended several 
times, most recently in 2015 (Lexology 2015). The subsequent changes were introduced to 
address the current internal and international challenges the high-tech industry faces, by 
creating optimal conditions for its development. 
The Israeli innovation policy was to set and constantly adjust the series of systemically 
organized constitutive elements of innovation ecosystem and relations and interconnections 
between them. Israeli innovation policy is founded and based on long-lasting and advanced 
cooperation between state institutions, business (in the elaborated case, the innovative 
industry) and academia (universities and research and development centers) (Trajtenberg 
M.2005). No doubt the heart of the Israeli innovativeness is the high level of development 
of human capital (world rank 19) which corresponds with the high level of Israel’s Human 
Development Index (0.899) (UN DP, 2018). Looking for alternative figures representing the 
potential of Israeli innovation’s ecosystem in terms of human capital, one can mention the 
number of researchers per 1,000 employed – which is the highest in the world and in case 
of Israel it is over 17 (OECD 2016). 
A crucial factor shaping the human capital development in Israel is its migration policy, 
based on the Law of Return addressed exclusively to the Diaspora Jews, combined with 
a well organised immigrants absorption system. Israeli authorities have been aware that 
among Jewish newcomers, there have been always a number of highly educated, skilled 
professionals. This applied especially to the Russian speakers Aliyah (also called: the 1990’s 
post-Soviet Aliyah). To optimally utilize the knowledge and skills of migrants, the Center 
for Absorption in Science under the Ministry of Aliyah and Immigrant Absorption has 
been established. This specific institution is to facilitate the absorption of the immigrants 
(or returning resident scientists) into the R&D system and academic research institutions 
in Israel, by using the knowledge and experience that these scientists bring with them 
(Ministry of Aliyah and Integration, 2018). Israel’s above mentioned immigration policy was 
an important component of the strategy of skills formation and utilization in the context 
of a larger – countrywide scale. 
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In addition, the Israeli authorities were interested in establishing entrepreneurial 
high-tech clusters and combing them with the Technological Incubators Program (TIP)2 
(Wonglimpiyarat 2015, p. 85). The program was launched in 1991 and in more than two 
decades of operating, it has established over 70 new start-ups each year. What is more, 
since the beginning of the program, 41% of the incubatees are still in business (Rubin et 
al., 2015, p. 15). 
An import element of every innovation ecosystem are the R&D centers, which most 
often are affiliated to Universities and sometimes have the status of independent units. 
Israel has seven research universities: Technion – the Israel Institute of Technology located 
in Haifa is listed on the Academic Ranking of World Universities (the Shanghai Ranking); 
the Weizmann Institute located in Rehovot is known as a leading multidisciplinary research 
institution in the natural and exact sciences: Tel Aviv University, which is the largest aca-
demic institutions in Israel; The Hebrew University of Jerusalem; Ben-Gurion University 
of the Negev, located in Be’er Sheva where the Advanced Technologies Park adjacent to 
the university was created; the University of Haifa; and finally Ariel University based in 
the Israeli settlement in the West Bank. All of those institutions are conducting advanced 
research in the fields of: natural science, mathematics, applied science, engineering and 
computer science. Besides the Universities there are also seven public research institutes3. 
Universities as well as public research institutes cooperate closely with the industry and 
business sectors. The scientific research and technologies are commercialized through the 
university-owned technology transfer companies (TTCs). Today, many Israeli universities 
have entrepreneurship centers, for example, Bronica Entrepreneurship Center at Technion 
and StarTau at Tel Aviv University (Wonglimpiyarat, 2015, p.85). However, the Universities 
which have in past years transformed from “being conventional research and education 
hubs to being innovation promoting knowledge hubs” (Rubin et al., 2015, p. 12) are not the 
only source of knowledge. 
The attractiveness, competitiveness and finally impact and importance of Israeli science 
is reflected by the number of articles by Israeli scholars published in prestigious Journals. 
The number of articles by Israeli scientists listed in the Science Citation Index, the Social 
Science Citation Index and the Arts & Humanities Citation Index shows a linear-growth 
over the past five decades. 
2  The Israeli government provides 85% for each incubatee’s funding. 
3  1. Agricultural Research Organization – Volcani Center; 2. Israel Oceanographic and Limnological 
Research (IOLR); 3. Israel Institute for Biological Research Applied 4. The Geophysical Institute of Israel; 
5. Soreq Nuclear Research Center Conducts, 6. The Interuniversity Institute for Marine Sciences in Eilat; 
7. The Fisher Institute for Air and Space Strategic Studies.
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The operation of the Israeli innovation policy is based on several programs4, profiled 
adequately to the needs of its potential beneficiaries. The most significant institution re-
sponsible for implementation of state innovation policy is the Israel Innovation Authority 
(IIA) (which was established by the fusion of the Office of the Chief Scientist of the Ministry 
of Economy and MATIMOP (the Israeli Industry Center for R&D)5. The establishment of 
the IIA is an Israeli government response to the need to quickly and efficiently confront 
the rapidly changing needs and challenges facing the IT industry, which stem from the 
increasing competitiveness of the world economy. The new institutions gain greater power 
and flexibility to enable rapid response. On the other hand it can be said that this recent 
consolidation of innovation policy institutional framework was to give more power and 
influence to the political decision makers (or simply state institutions) over the shape and 
content of the policy, which should serve to achieve national policy goals. But yet the IIA 
advises the government and Parliament (“Knesset”) committees regarding innovation 
policy in Israel and furthermore monitors and analyzes the dynamic changes taking place 
throughout the innovation environments in Israel and abroad. These mechanisms make 
the process of creation and operationalization of innovation policy bidirectional, if not 
multidimensional since IIA agenda of action is set be a permanent and in-depth relationship 
with business/industry and academia. However it is true that the last word concerning the 
shape and content of the innovation policy and its short, medium and long-term goals 
belongs to the state authorities (the government).
If we take a closer look at the profile of the ongoing programs lunched by the IIA we can 
have a better sense of the preferences and priorities of the Israeli government with respect 
to directions of development of innovation policy. The strategic programs and initiatives 
are designed to strengthen the Israeli position in the technologically-specialised sectors 
of the global economy. What is more, they reflect existential needs of the state itself. As 
a representative example one can point to the KIDMA2.0 program which aims to promote 
Israeli industry in the field of cyber security. 
Key mechanism of Israeli innovation policy 
The topic of the conceptualization and classification of Israeli innovation policy instruments 
and mechanisms has already been touched upon above. It’s also worth underlining that this 
4  Israeli innovation policy programs dedicated to develop technological infrastructure: MAGNET, 
MAGNETON, NOFAR, TZATAM, KAMIN, MEIMAD, Industrial Research Institutes, MIDGAM Bank., 
KIDMA2.0.
5  Beside the IIA, there are in Israel other public/state institutions involved in formulating and/or 
implementing innovation policy. At first it is the Ministry of Science, Technology and Space, the Ministry 
of Finance and finally the Planning and Budgeting Committee of the Council for Higher Education which 
promotes and allocates funding for scientific research in the academic sector. 
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specific issue could become a theme for separate analyses, but here we only point out the two 
most relevant6 mechanisms. One is the mechanism of broadly defined internationalization 
of innovation policy and the second, to a big extent connected to the first, is market oriented 
liberal, economic policy availability of venture capital (VC). 
As for the internationalization of Israeli innovations and connecting the Israeli economy 
with the global innovation industry, it is being done firstly through initiating and establish-
ing international agreements with countries and multinational corporations (IIA 2017a). 
This helps to deepen the bilateral relations between Israel and selected (mostly the most 
economically advanced and politically powerful) countries in the world. Israel has also 
four binational funds, with countries that are highly advanced in the field of innovation 
and R&D (US, Canada, South Korea and Singapore). The longest and the richest history is 
that of the Israeli-US R&D cooperation. In 1977 both state governments established the 
Israel-U.S. Binational Industrial Research and Development Foundation (BIRD) which aimed 
to stimulate, promote and support industrial R&D of mutual benefit to the U.S. and Israel. 
Since its inception in 1977, BIRD has approved over 950 projects with leading companies 
in the U.S. (e.g.: Bayer Pharmaceutical, Eastman Kodak, General Dynamics, IBM, Motorola, 
Procter & Gamble, SanDisk, Spansion, Telcordia). Israel – U.S. cooperation in the field is 
also facilitated by the Binational Science Foundation, the Binational Agriculture Research 
and Development Fund and the U.S. – Israel Science and Technology Foundation. Such 
cooperation is not only a matter of knowledge exchange or a business transaction, (see 
more and compare: Spiegel, 2013, p.4); it is based on a politically rooted mutual understand-
ing of each partner’s interest. In both cases, the national pragmatic interest which stands 
behind the R&D cooperation is strongly connected with geopolitical needs and ambitions. 
This applies especially to cooperation with North America. Moreover, the international 
cooperation, which has become the top priority of the strategy of the analyzed policy, has 
resulted in Israel increasing international research grants co-authorship. Individual Israeli 
scholars and research institutions have successfully became part of international research 
teams and consortia. Just to mention, Israel was the first non-EU country to be associated 
to the EU Framework Programme back in 1996. Since then over 3,000 projects submitted 
by Israeli entities have been approved involving 4,435 participants (of these, 2,450 were 
academic researchers, 1,270 were industrial researchers, and 715 researchers from other 
sectors) (European Commission, 2018).
But yet there is also a deeper geopolitical sense in Israel’s new foreign relations with 
non-Western regions/states (e.g. South Korea, Singapore and also China and India). This 
new phenomenon can be seen as attempt to multiply and diversify the desired Israeli 
diplomacy goals. By gaining new partners and creating new forms of beneficial cooperation 
(joint innovative projects such as a wave energy power station in cooperation with Indian 
6  The estimation of relevance of pointed mechanisms was based on critical analysis of primary 
sources and literature. 
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business conglomerate Shapoorji Pallonji in Ghana or lunching the first Israeli University 
in China:Guangdong (Technion Israel Institute of Technology), Israel is trying to balance 
traditional foreign policy connections byincreasing its importance and influence (Technion 
2018, Israel21 2018). This balancing and diversification strategy is related to the neorealist 
vision (Waltz, 1979) of the freedom and independence in international relations. It can be 
also seen and explained by Israeli diplomacy desire to look for partners among those states 
“who are able to look at Israel beyond the Israeli – Arab (especially Palestinian) conflict 
(MFA, 2018). 
And finally, internationalization is also about attracting foreign (international) invest-
ment in the innovative sectors of the Israeli economy. When defining the conditions and 
parameters of the development of an economy based on new technologies, often the attention 
is paid to the model of financing the innovations. Nowadays the major sources of R&D 
financing in Israel are a combination of business enterprise and foreign sectors (in 2012: 
84%) and the combination of government and higher education sectors (12%). The foreign 
financing component alone reached 49%. in 2012 (UNESCO, 2016). We can use the above 
as evidence that Israel’s innovation ecosystem relies on foreign multinationals and large 
corporate R&D investors. Indeed, an impressive number of multinational companies have 
set their sights on Israel, having R&D centers there. Amongst them are: : IBM, Motorola, 
Microsoft, Facebook, Apple, General Motors, Google, Microsoft, Cisco and Hewlett Packard 
but also Siemens and Samsung (Foreign Investments and Industrial Cooperation Authority 
2016, p. 2, 8 – 11). So we observe in Israel a progressively rising set of factors and conditions 
which attracts and facilitates investment of global firms in this country. This is generally 
based on government incentives and the availability of high-level human capital. 
One of the key factors of the high-technology sector development in Israel over the past 
decades is the constantly increasing availability of venture capital (VC). According to the 
Global Competitiveness Index 2017 – 2018, Israel is ranked at 2nd place, right after the US, in 
terms of VC availability (World Economic Forum 2018). To encourage investors in eligible 
VC funds, the Israeli government has introduced several mechanisms including the 1993 
Yozma program which allowed tax exemption on the income generated from investment 
in the Israeli IT industry. At the end of 2016, the Law for Encouragement of Capital Invest-
ments was amended to reduce corporate tax for high-tech companies from 25 percent to 
6 – 12 percent, depending on the nature of the company. It also instituted additional tax 
benefits on dividends and capital gains tax (IIA 2018). In 2016, there were about 50 active 
venture capital funds in Israel. What is more, between 2007 – 2016, a total of about US$9.13 
billion was raised by Israel’s venture capital industry (LegCo 2018, p. 6). Finally, the Israeli 
economic growth strategy aims to increase exports, mostly by tax exemptions and less by 
manipulating the currency exchange rate. 
Summing up this section, one can recall the outcomes of empirical research conducted by 
the Samuel Neaman Institute. According to the authors of the report, the innovation process 
in Israel is driven by six major factors in the following order: 1. Government programs for 
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supporting innovation and constant government investment in basic research; 2. Private 
and public sector activities for supporting innovation; 3. Cooperation between the private 
and public sector in supporting technological innovation; 4. Government investments 
for the creation of human capital; 5. Creating demand in the private sector, increasing 
demand for technological development in biomedicine and biotechnology; 6. National and 
international research funds, government and international funds for research (Frenkel, et 
al. 2011, p. 6,8).
The above quoted research findings together with a tentative analysis of these sections 
proves the key role of the government in the innovative process. The state authorities not 
only initiate and shape the directions and conditions of the innovation policy, but without 
constant financial, legal and also political (in the home and external / foreign policy) support, 
the success of the innovative private sector would not be possible. Considering the above, it 
can be said that innovativeness in Israel can be seen as an instrument, not a goal itself.
Achievements and benefits vs. challenges and disadvantages of the Israeli 
innovation policy 
Achievements and benefits
As discussed above a crucial element of the strategy of ‘economic independence’ or better 
to say ‘the strategy of reducing the interdependence’ and in some cases ‘dependence’, was to 
become a global innovative player. Israel aimed at becoming a provider / supplier of advanced 
solutions, popular high technologies and innovative products. In other words, Israel in the 
global political and economic competitive game has become rather ‘giver’ than ‘taker’ – this 
has eventually decreased its dependence on other players and increased the dependence 
of others on Israel. Just to mention the nature of the arms trade, which creates a specific 
relation between exporter and importers. A similar, but not identical, mechanism applies to 
building up complex relationships between Israel and its partners when it comes to natural 
resources supplies (e.g. Israeli export of LNG or desalinated water).
To illustrate the achievements of Israeli economic policy, to a large extent based on 
hi-tech industry, both in its external and internal dimension, one can start with pointing 
out major indicators of the success of Israeli ‘hawkish neoliberalism’. First, as A. Krampf 
accurately noted “in the year 2014, the current account surplus of Israel surpassed US$10 
billion, demonstrating that Israel had turned from a chronic current account deficit country 
into a surplus country” (Krampf 2018). Second, Israel’s external debt accounted for 27.6 % of 
the country’s nominal GDP in 2016 (CEIC 2017), which is a remarkable feat given the fact 
that at the same time the government debt to GDP ratio in the EU28 has been calculated 
at over 80% (Eurostat 2017). Thirdly, in 2017 the foreign exchange reserves held by the 
Bank of Israel exceeded US$100 billion (Krampf 2018). And finally, Israel is the 37th largest 
export economy in the world (OECD 2018). Though in 2016, Israel exported less than it 
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imported, which resulted in a negative trade balance of 6,592million of dollars, the directions 
and structure of the trade exchange can be perceived as beneficial for the national Israeli 
economic system (CBS 2017). As for the other macroeconomics parameters and trends 
which may characterize the Israeli economy, the GDP in Israel in recent years has risen 
significantly. Data shows that between the years 2003 and 2013, GDP grew by 36%, while 
the GDP per capita rose by 23% (UNESCO 2016, p.27). 
The circumstances and factors mentioned in the above, are not only affecting, but even 
co-creating the position of Israel on the international stage. Israel aims to become a state that 
sets and shapes the conditions of international political and economic relations, rather than 
a country who is supposed to adjust to it. The strong economic performance and success in 
technological innovativeness helps Israel to improve the international image of the country 
in many ways. First, Israel is perceived as a reliable, stable partner in business (especially in 
trading). Secondly, Israel and Israelis are seen as suppliers of knowledge and technologies, 
and are therefore an attractive partner in R&D international scientific consortia, or purely 
commercial (for example selling the technologies7). Thirdly, Israelis found a brilliant way 
to link Israeli experiences in fighting the fundamental Islamic terror and being a provider 
of technologies in the realm of security (including cybersecurity) with the image and, 
consequently, design brand of a country who struggles for values of a western civilization. 
Surprisingly, from a state which has been associated with being a threat to international 
peace and security by western societies (mostly European) in the first decade of 2000’s 
(The Guardian 2003), Israel has managed to break down this image. It is argued that the 
turning point which facilitated the changes were the terrorist attacks in Europe (inter alia 
in 2015 in Paris) and the activity of the so called Islamic State (Szydzisz 2017, p. 211 – 212). 
Additionally, in the past few years Israel has managed to separate the issue of the conflict 
with Palestinians from the diplomatic dialogue conducted in the framework of bilateral and 
even multilateral relations. Sometimes Israel even succeeded in presenting it as an internal 
(not international) problem, and to thus isolate it from the agenda of international (mostly 
bilateral) discourse. Recently, Israeli diplomacy was mostly successful with several efforts to 
shape the international security discourse on the situation in the Mediterranean and Middle 
East regions and Israel’s roles in it. This has been done by underlining the Israeli struggle to 
eliminate the existential threats which were addressed from the neighbourhood. This threat 
is a shared concern of Israel and European states, as long as the situation in Middle East 
remains unstable, shaped by radical Islamic movements and resulting in terrorist attacks and 
waves of Arab migrants to Europe. Paradoxically, the combination of the briefly described 
circumstances is improving the international recognition and legitimacy of Israel. 
7  E.g.: Polish power grid operator PSE signed a contract with Israel Electric Corporation Limited on 
cooperation in the field of cyber threats in the energy sector. In: Businessinsider (2018).Polish power grid 
operator to work with Israeli utility on cyber-security, 30.01.2018, http://www.businessinsider.com/r-po-
lish-power-grid-operator-to-work-with-israeli-utility-on-cyber-security-2018 – 1?IR=T
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Challenges and disadvantages
Israeli innovation policy achievements and their direct and indirect outcomes might be 
seen as very successful. Nevertheless, the policy itself as described and characterized in this 
paper has several, not necessarily expected, side effects. Israel’s high economic performance 
is to be explained by the dominance of the high-technology sectors, in particular the ICT 
manufacturing and services sectors. However, as mentioned at the beginning of this paper, 
innovative sectors of Israel’s economy are only small piece of the country’s economic system. 
The traditional industry and service sectors are much larger. The model of economic growth 
based on exclusive high-tech industry, resulted in the unsustainable, dual economic structure 
of the labor market. On one hand there is a group of workers who are concentrated in the 
Israeli metropolitan area (in and around Tel Aviv) employed in innovative technological 
sectors. On the other hand, there is a poorly paid labor force living mostly on the periphery. 
The disproportion in incomes is not the only serious socio-economic consequence of the 
specific dual structure of labor market (USISTC 2008; UNESCO, 2016). It can be argued that 
the neoliberal, nationalist model of the Israeli economy causes insufficient inclusiveness 
and more, it is one reason for the deepening and strengthening poverty and inequality in 
Israel. Israel’s economic system suffers from a high level of inequality, which refers mostly 
to inequality in income, rather than in life expectancy or education. Finally, the outcome 
of the Israeli hi–tech export oriented economic strategy is a growing a level of export con-
centration. About 65% of goods and services exported from Israel have been manufactured 
by companies with a high level of innovation (mainly from the hi-tech, pharmaceutical 
and chemical industries). Remembering the fiscal privileges inter alia tax exemptions.
In the light of this analysis another issue needs to be questioned; namely how Israelis 
want to preserve and maintain the country’s leadership position in R&D international mar-
ket. To do so, bearing in mind all the limitations and dangers (including those geopolitical), 
Israeli policy makers must first address the need to reinforce the human capital development. 
If there isn’t a dramatic increase in the number of people employed in the hi-tech industry, 
the Israeli economy will lose momentum (IIA 2017b). According to the Israel Innovation 
Authority’s report, half-a-million additional employees in the innovation industry will be 
required within a decade (doubling the current number). This applies mostly to the skilled 
workforce in hi-tech (Ibid). However such a specialist can easily find a well-paid job or start 
their business elsewhere – not necessarily in Israel. The power of attractiveness (in terms of 
living standards, security and welfare) of other innovative economies (e.g. Germany, U.S.A. 
Canada) might be another advantage for Israel – this time not strengthening but harming 
the national economic system.
Considering the above side effects of Israeli economic strategy, we can assume that the 
primary aim of state authorities is not to provide economic welfare and social justice to 
every citizen, but to provide security to the nation. It can be said in Israel upgrading the 
national interest over the preferences of individual citizens or social group inequality and 
Joanna Dyduch, Karolina Olszewska 280
asymmetric distribution of benefits from being the innovative power, is to big extent accepted 
and legitimized. This coherently coexists with the neoliberal economic principles which 
are focused on economic rationality to maximize the benefits and minimalize the cost, or 
in other words, to have more for less. So to upgrade the state position in the international 
arena and to strengthen the Israel influence on the international economic and political 
process, the Israeli government needs to attract foreign capital and create a special kind of 
interdependence between the market players and its own economy, based on the advantages 
of the second.  
Conclusion
As has been argued in the paper, efficiency in the field of innovation (especially in developing 
innovative technologies) is one of the pillars of the Israeli strategy of increasing competi-
tiveness and even competitive advantage in the international arena. This is being achieved 
through technological advancement, which is a result of the effective innovation policy and 
the functionality of the national innovation ecosystem. However, developing the national 
economy through innovativeness is not a goal itself, it is subordinated to the implementa-
tion of political goals. So, it can be said, the Israeli innovative economy is an instrument for 
the implementation of the state’s strategic goals in regional and global geopolitical rivalry. 
Israel, thanks to the technological advancement and high level of competitiveness is among 
a small group of countries controlling globalization processes. Israel has established itself 
as one of the most technologically advanced countries in the world and a global innovation 
hub. It is claimed that the success of Israeli economy is a result of strong government–led 
policies. Moreover, strategies and actions taken by the rulers in Israel (who, in recent years, 
are becoming more and more involved in shaping economic processes in the country and 
abroad) confirm the validity of K. Waltz’s following assumptions: Firstly, because govern-
ments intensified activity in economic affairs, interdependence has become less of an autono-
mous force in international politics; Secondly, states with larger GDPs are rarely dependent 
on others, while a number of states are heavily dependent on them (Waltz 1999, p.698). It 
seems that the case of Israel is a good example of this regularity. As the paper shows Israel is 
struggling to decrease the level of international dependency using the economic means. 
The shape and content of the Israeli innovation ecosystem reflects the political strategy 
of the state. Most of all the core element of the strategy is the security concerns, which are 
not necessarily coherent with the social and economic needs of the majority of Israelis. 
In light of this analysis, the disadvantages of the Israeli economic system described above 
are not an unintended side effect of the government’s innovation policy or its immaturity. 
Simply, it can be considered as being a result of state economic policy and rather a legitimate 
(also by the society) cost of geopolitical and geoeconomic strategy. Israelis do legitimize 
the disadvantages of the country’s economic situation, though they tend to complain about 
it very often. However, they believe that the unsustainable distribution of benefits from 
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being an innovative power is related to the security strategy. The specific version of Israeli 
national neoliberalism seems to be quite functional and so far there are no serious debates 
or claims to considerably change it or replace it. The philosophy of the Israeli political and 
economic strategy is based on the assumption that the primary goal of the state’s policies is 
not welfare at first but security. As A. Krampf put it “Israel is rich country with poor citizens”, 
but state richness is not to make people happy, rather it is to make them feel secure. As 
long as the security narrative will be present and well-founded in Israeli public discourse, 
socio-economic preferences of the citizens will remind marginalized. 
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